| ??? 02/26/08 12:01 Read: times |
#151478 - this is a different form of security Responding to: ???'s previous message |
Oliver Sedlacek said:
There are a number of specialist secure micros on the market, mostly aimed at 'chip-and-pin' and smartcard applications. Maxim-Dallas do some, and it's well worth reading their security notes, such as app note 3824 The Dallas chips implement a slightly different form of security than the smartcards. What Dallas is attempting to do is a device which is always alive and can actively monitor its environment, where the vulnerable parts sit. This is an order of magnitude more complex (read: expensive) than the "passive" forms of security. Oh, and even they did it wrong - see the famous Markus Kuhn's thesis. What we need is most of the time the smartcard-type security, i.e. preventing code extraction on a device fully available to the intruder. JW |
| Topic | Author | Date |
| Obtaining maximum code security | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| Worth it ? | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| Protection with Patents | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| the value... again... | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| "OCR"ing a Design | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| It's a brave man | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| Specialist secure micros | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| this is a different form of security | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| Huge NREs? | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| What if you don't bond out nPSEN? | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| why not drop !EA | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| Don't Drop !EA! | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| Couldn\'t you do that in another way | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| Eliminating /EA | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| The value of PSEN | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| not only... | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| Brute-force copying | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| well, maybe... | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| Erase on tamper detect | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| Make the chip hard to access | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
| It's quite impractical... | 01/01/70 00:00 | |
few thousand dollars ... Not at all | 01/01/70 00:00 |